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SOUTHERN UTE: TRIAL COURT -TO-SUPREME COURT'
ELIZABETH

A. MCCLANAHAN* AND JILL M. HARRISON**

One of the most interesting coalbed methane cases in the
United States involved the historical relationship between the United
States Government and Native Americans. This article focuses on
the development of the case and its legal aspects from its origin at the
United States District Court of Colorado to its 1999 decision in the
United States Supreme Court. This eight year battle will have farreaching effects throughout the country.
I. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF COLORADO

In Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co.,2 the
Southern Ute Indian Tribe ("Tribe") asserted that it owned the
coalbed gas underlying approximately 200,000 acres of land within
the Southern Ute Indian Reservation in southwestern Colorado
("land"). The United States opened the land to non-Indian settlement,
in particular to homestead patentees, under the Act of March 3,

'The author wishes to thank the Natural Resources Law Center of the University of
Colorado School of Law and the El Paso Natural Gas Foundation for providing her with the
opportunity for extensive research on coalbed methane as their 1993-94 El Paso Natural Gas
Law Fellow and the University of Oklahoma Law Review for publishing the fruits of that
research. See Elizabeth A. McClanahan, Coalbed Methane: Myths, Facts, and Legends of its
History and the Legislative and Regulatory Climate in the 21st Century, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 471
(1995). She also wishes to acknowledge and thank Sharon 0. Flanery, Esq., co-author of the
Mineral Law Update presented at the 151h Annual Energy and Mineral Law Foundation Annual
Institute in Lexington, Kentucky, for her assistance with the first case summary of the Southern
Ute pending litigation.
*Member, Board of Trustees of the Energy and Mineral Law Foundation,
recognized as a national authority on coal bed methane. Selected as the El Paso Natural Gas
Law Fellow for the Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law in
1994. Member of the National Chamber Foundation Board of the United States Chamber of
Commerce, Virginia Bar Association Judiciary Committee, Vice President of the Board of
Directors for the Virginia Oil and Gas Association., Member of the Board of Directors for the
North American Coalbed Methane Forum. In addition, she serves as Vice-Rector of The
College of William and Mary, is past chairman of the State Council of Higher Education for the
state of Virginia, and serves on the Board of Trustees for Emory & Henry College, as well as
the Board of Directors for the Wellmont Bristol Regional Medical Center. J.D., University of
Dayton School of Law.
**Jill M. Harrison has extensive experience performing title examinations for coal,
oil and gas acquisitions and development. She also appears before the Virginia Gas and Oil
Board on various administrative matters. She is a member of the Appalachian Association of
Professional Landmen (AAPL). Harrison also serves on the Bristol Tennessee Planning
Commission.
2
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Colo. 1995)
[hereinafter Southern Ute]. See also Native Americans Denied Valuable Coalgas 38 COAL &
SYNFUELS TECH., Vol. 18, (Oct. 3, 1994); Indian Mineral Rights Don't Include Gas, GAS
DAILY, Oct. 12, 1994.
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1909, 3 and the Coal Lands Act of 19104 ("1909 and 1910 Acts"). The
patentees received all surface and mineral rights except "coal," which
was reserved to the federal government. The federal government
conveyed the coal to the Tribe in 1938. Subsequently, the Tribe
claimed that the coal estate included coalbed gas.
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF COAL

The reservation lands became available for public entry
either under the Homestead Act of 1862,' which allowed entry for
agricultural purposes, or the Coal Lands Act of 18736 and the Mining
Law of 1872, 7 which provided for entry for mining purposes. These
acts were subject to substantial abuse, however, because entrymen
predominately classified their lands as agricultural, which entitled
them to ownership of the land in fee without payment. The acts
required coal miners or oil and gas explorers to pay statutorily
mandated amounts for lands they acquired. The Department of the
Interior relied on the entrymen's classification without further
investigation, and the Department conveyed vast amounts of mineral
wealth without payment.
In response to this practice, President Theodore Roosevelt
ordered the Department of the Interior to withdraw those lands that
contained "workable coal" from the entry lands and to suspend the
issuance of homestead patents on such lands. 8 This left agricultural
homesteaders who had been working coal lands for agricultural
purposes in a quandary because they had already invested time and
labor in tracts which were no longer available for homestead patents.
The congressional response was the 1909 and 1910 Acts. Under the
1909 and 1910 Acts, homestead patentees were granted all surface
and mineral rights except "coal," which was reserved to the federal
government. Approximately 1.47 million acres of the withdrawn
acreage, located near Durango, Colorado, included the acreage in the
Southern Ute case. Many homesteaders were issued patents subject
only to the United States' coal reservation. Consequently, "[t]he non3

Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 270, 35 Stat. 844 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1995)).
Coal Lands Act of 1910, ch. 318, 36 Stat. 583 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§
83-85 (1995)).
5
Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§
161-162, 164, 171 (1995)).
6
Coal Lands Act of 1873, ch. 279, 17 Stat. 607 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.§§
71-76 (1995)).
7
Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1812) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
4

§§ 21-24 (1995)).

841 CONG. REC. 2614-15, 2806-08 (1907).
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federal defendants in this case claim their respective rights, titles and
interests as successors in interest to these patentees." 9
In 1934, however, the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA")
The IRA
reversed federal policy towards tribal ownership.' 0
authorized restoring any surplus Indian reservation lands to tribal
ownership. Pursuant to the IRA, the federal government conveyed
the reserved rights to approximately 200,000 acres of coal. Patents
issued to non-Indian entrymen under the. 1909 and 1910 Acts had
reserved this coal to the United States.
III. THE PARTIES AND THEIR POSITIONS
The defendants were comprised of an estimated 20,000
individuals ("mineral owner defendants") who owned the oil and gas
estates underlying the land, approximately twenty oil and gas
companies ("oil company defendants") that had extracted coalbed gas
under oil and gas leases issued by mineral owner defendants, and
federal government defendants who had not opposed the extraction of
the coalbed gas by the oil company defendants. The relief the Tribe
requested included a beneficial interest in the coalbed gas and an
award of damages for the value of the extracted coalbed gas.
Additionally, the Tribe requested an order granting them ownership
of all facilities owned by oil company defendants and installed for the
purpose of extracting the coalbed gas. Lastly, they asked for a
declaratory judgment that the federal defendants had a fiduciary duty
to hold the coalbed gas in trust for the Tribe."
The primary issue in the case was whether coalbed gas was
included in the "coal" reserved to the federal government in the 1909
and 1910 Acts. Since 1981, the Department of the Interior had taken
the position that coalbed gas was not included.' 2 Defendants moved
for summary judgment. They asserted that the legislative history of
the 1909 and 1910 Acts compelled the conclusion that Congress
intended to reserve only solid mineral coal, and not coalbed gas.
9

Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1151.
10lndian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1995)).
Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1149-50.
"Southern
2
S Ownership of And Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in Federal Coal Deposits, 88
Interior Dec. 538 (1981) [hereinafter "1981 Solicitor's Opinion"] ("I conclude that ... the
Reservation of coal to the United States in the Act of Mar. 3, 1909 and the Act of June 22,
1910, 30 USC § 81, 83-85 (1976), did not include the coalbed gas found in the reserved coal.").
Id. at 540. See infra text accompanying note 79 (1981 Solicitor's Opinion withdrawn).
13Brief for Defendant in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 13,
Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Colo. 1995) (No. 91-B02273) [hereinafter Brief for
Defendant].
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Defendants also relied on the legislative history and
substantive provisions of: (1) the 1914 Act, 14 by which the United
States reserved gas, including coalbed gas, to itself; (2) the StockRaising Homestead Act of 1916,15 by which, for the first time, the
United States reserved in itself all minerals and not just the
specifically enumerated minerals; (3) the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, 16 by which the United States provided separate procedures for
the exploration and development of gas and coal and narrowly
defined "coal" absent any reference to gases associated with coal;
and, (4) the Uraniferous Lignite Act of 1955,' 7 by which the United
States recognized that patentees under the 1909 and 1910 Acts
owned, and had the right to develop, uranium found in association
with coal. 18 They also cited the extensive and separate regulatory
schemes under federal law for coal and gas, and the different
practical considerations governing the development of coal and
coalbed gas resources.
Defendants' next argument was based upon the 1981
Solicitor's Opinion that the United States did not reserve coalbed gas
under the 1909 and 1910 Acts. Defendants contended that the court
was bound by the Department of the Interior's construction of the
1909 and 1910 Acts because the construction was not unreasonable. 9
Defendants also asserted that they were entitled to summary
judgment because the only claim against the United States was timebarred and the United States was an indispensable party to the
action. 20 The six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)
governed the Tribe's claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the
United States. Defendants asserted that the claim accrued not later
than July 22, 1985, when the Tribe admits it received a copy of the
1981 Solicitor's Opinion, and that consequently the claim was timebarred because the Tribe did not bring this action until December 31,
1991, more than six years and five months after accrual. 2' The
United States was claimed to be an indispensable party under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 22 because resolution of the Tribe's
claim will effect the rights and duties of the United States and will
determine whether the United States owns the coalbed gas underlying
'430 U.S.C. §§ 121-123 (1995).
1543 U.S.C. § 299 (1995).
1630

U.S.C. 181-287 (1995).

7

' 1d. 541-541(i).
18

9 Brief

for Defendant, at 43-55.

' 1d. at 94-96.
2

at 132-37.
id.
22d. at 137 (citing FED. R. Cv. P. 19).
2 1ld.
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about 16.2 million acres of land throughout the United States, and not
just the 200,000 acres involved in this case.23
Finally, defendants asserted that the doctrine of laches barred
the Tribe's claims, in addition to the doctrines of acquiescence and
estoppel. The Tribe brought this action more than ten years after the
1981 Solicitor's Opinion was issued and more than six years after the
Tribe had received a copy of the opinion. Defendants alleged that the
Tribe did not assert its claim of ownership promptly, but instead
encouraged coalbed gas development on the reservation.24 The Tribe
voluntarily entered into communitization agreements whereby Tribal
and private lands were pooled to produce coalbed gas, received and
retained royalties for coalbed gas produced pursuant to Tribal oil and
gas leases, entered into rights-of-way and water disposal agreements,
which facilitated the development of coalbed gas, and sponsored a
forum on coalbed gas development. The Tribe delayed bringing its
action until after virtually all land on the Reservation had been leased
for oil and gas development, after oil company defendants had
incurred enormous costs and taken substantial risks, and after coalbed
gas had been proven to be a valuable resource.25

IV. DISTRICT COURT DECISION
On September 13, 1994, the United States District Court
ruled on the summary judgment motions filed by Amoco and the
Tribe.26 The district court held that under the 1909 and 1910 Acts,
the reservation of "coal" did not include coalbed methane. The court
found that the plain meaning of the word "coal" was a solid
combustible mineral substance as evidenced by dictionaries of the
time and by modem dictionaries. The statute was, therefore, clear on
its face and contained no ambiguity. Secondary materials such as
legislative history were unnecessary to make the determination of
ownership.
Nonetheless, the court exhaustively reviewed the
legislative history. The court found that the 1909 and 1910 Acts
were intended to be only a narrow departure from previous laws,
which had provided for the issuance of homestead patents in fee.
2'1d. at 140.
24

25Brief for
id "

Defendant, at 143-46.

26
Prior to the district court's ruling, the case was appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals (10th Circuit) on procedural issues. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco
Production Co., 2 F.3d 1023 (1993) (appealing the district court's cost allocation order requiring
the Tribe to pay 25% of the cost of mineral and land title examinations from which the Tribe
desired to obtain names for class defendant notification purposes. Reversed and remanded to
the district court for further proceedings.).
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Because all mineral rights had previously been granted, the court held
that the 1909 and 1910 Acts included only solid coal, and not coalbed
gas.
The court based its rulings, in part, on the history of federal
coal legislation beginning with the Act of 1880 (" 1880 Act").27 The
1880 Act terminated tribal ownership in the reservation lands which
the government opened to non-Indian settlement. In addition, it
limited Indian land ownership to a specific amount allotted in
severalty to individual Indians. 28 The court held that "the central
feature of the 1880 Act was the termination of tribalownership in the
reservation lands ....,,29 "All lands not allotted in severalty to
individual Indians, then, including the lands in question here, were
by the Utes . . .to become public lands of the United
conveyed
0
3
States.
The Tribe claimed that the United States' coal reservations in
the 1909 and 1910 Acts included the coalbed gas. 3' However, the
district court held as a matter of law that Congress's coal reservation
in the 1909 and 1910 Acts did not reserve coalbed gas. The title to
coalbed gas was conveyed by United States patents issued to
homesteaders under the 1909 and 1910 Acts. Therefore, the Tribe
did not acquire title to the coalbed gas when the United States
restored the coal to the Tribe under the IRA.32
V. COAL INCLUDING COALBED GAS

The Tribe argued that in the 1909 and 1910 Acts the word
"coal" might refer to the rock as well as the gas contained in and
around the rock. The court disagreed stating that statutory
construction is a question of law. In construing a statute, the primary
task is "to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has
been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. 33 Furthermore, the court held
that the relevant congressional intent is that existing at the time of a
statute's enactment.34

27

Act of June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199.

2810 CONG. REC. 2059, 2066 (1880).
29

Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1148 (citing United States v. Southern Ute, 402 U.S.
159, 163 (1971)).
30
402 U.S. 159 at 169.
3 11d. See also United States v. Southern Ute Tribe,
Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1151.
32
1d. at 1152.
33Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1993).
3Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 62 (1983).
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To determine congressional intent when Congress does not

specifically define a term, courts presume the ordinary meaning
applies. 35 Thus, the court held that it is appropriate to look at general

dictionary and encyclopedia definitions for the ordinary meaning.36
The court analyzed the differences between the Act of 1909 and the
Act of 1910. The Act of 1909 provided that the reservation patent
The Act of 1910 stated that
contained "all coal in said lands ....
the reservation patent contained "all the coal in the lands so patented
,,38

The term "coal" was not defined in the 1909 and 1910 Acts.
Therefore, the court held that the common ordinary meaning of the
word shall apply.39 The court based its decision upon several
definitions of coal. 40 All the definitions reviewed were consistent
with the definition of coal used throughout the decades of coal related
legislation. In addition, the court also reviewed the term "gas."41 The
definitions of both gas and coal have remained constant since the
35

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983). See also Balanced Rock Scenic
Attractions, Inc. v. Town of Anitou, 38 F.2d 28, 30 (10th Cir. 1930); United States v. Colorado
and N.W. Ry.
36 Co., 157 F. 321, 332 (8th Cir. 1907).
See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod., 322 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944); United States
v. Jackson, 759 F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir. 1985); Torti v. United States, 249 F.2d 623, 626 (7th
Cir. 1957).
"730 U.S.C. § 81 (1995) (emphasis added).
38
Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1152 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 85 (1995) (emphasis
added).
39
1d. at 1153.
40
1n Southern Ute, the following definitions of "coal" were reviewed by the court:
"[A] black, or brownish black, solid, combustible substance consisting... mainly of carbon."
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 244 (1889) (emphasis added).
WEBSTER'S THIRD
"[A] black or brownish black solid combustible mineral substance ...
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 432 (1986) (emphasis added).
"[A] black or brownish black solid combustible carbonaceous rock, classified as anthracite,
bituminous, subbituminous, or lignite .. " 25 C.F.R. § 216.101 (1993) (coal on Indian lands)
(emphasis added).
"[A] solid, brittle, more or less distinctly stratified, combustible carbonaceous rock, formed by
partial to complete decomposition of vegetation .... " A DICTIONARY OF MINING, MINERAL,
AND RELATED TERMS 222 (1968) (emphasis added).
"[A] solid.., substance varying in color from dark-brown to black, brittle, combustible, and
used as a fuel. A GLOSSARY OF THE MINING AND MINERAL INDUSTRY 163 (1920) (emphasis
Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1152-53.
added). Southern
41
In Southern Ute, the following definitions of "gas" were considered by the court:
"[A]n aeriform fluid supposed to be permanently elastic ... now applied to any substance when
in the elastic or aeriform state." AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 560
(1889).
"[A]n aeriform fluid, having neither independent shape nor volume, but tending to expand
indefinitely." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 892
(1902).
"[A] fluid (as air) that has neither independent shape nor volume but tends to expand
indefinitely...." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 937 (1986).
Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at I153.
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42

According to all the
enactment of the 1909 and 1910 Acts.
definitions, "coal" is defined in narrow, specific terms under which
coalbed gas does not qualify. 43 In contrast, "gas" is defined in broad,
general terms under which coalbed gas does qualify.
In sum, the court reasoned that Congress did not intend for
coalbed gas to be included in the definition of the 1909 and 1910
Acts for two reasons. First, congressional intent must be derived as
of the enactment date. 44 Secondly, the 1909 and 1910 Acts dealt with
coal in a "practical way"; therefore, coal should be applied in its
ordinary meaning.4 5
VI. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO RESERVE COALBED GAS

The Tribe argued that Congress intended to reserve coalbed
gas relying on two principles: (1) nothing passes by implication in a
public land grant; and (2) such grants should be interpreted in favor
of the government.46 The court held that the Tribe neglected the
maxim that "public land grants are not to be so construed as to defeat
the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is given either
expressly or by necessary or fair implication.' 47
The court viewed the legislative history of the 1909 and 1910
Acts and focused on Congress' intent at the time the statutes were
enacted. The 1909 and 1910 Acts were passed when coalbed gas was
not believed to be a valuable mineral. Instead, it was believed that
coalbed gas was only a hazard associated with coal mining.
Committee hearings and debates were conducted on the coal lands
legislation which illustrated congressional knowledge about coal.
Transcripts of the hearings show that Congress was aware of coalbed
gas and that it could be valuable in the future. However, no one
testified that coalbed gas was a valuable energy resource which
should be reserved by the United States in the 1909 and 1910 Acts.
Representative Franklin Mondell spoke about the bill when it was
being considered by Congress and never mentioned or referred to
48
The committee raised the question: "[w]hy is it
coalbed gas.
necessary to preserve and reserve ... the coal and not at the same
42

Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1153.

43

1d.
4

" Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 62 (1983).
45
46Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1154.
1d. at 1159 (citing Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prod. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617

(1978)).

47

1d. (citing Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682-83 (1979); United
& Rio Grand R.R., 150 U.S. I, 14 (1893)).
States v. Denver
48
d. at 1156 (citing 45 CONG. REC. 2502-04 (1909)).
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time reserve . . . other fuels such as gas and oil? 49 Mr. Mondell
answered "oil and gas present much greater difficulties [than coal],
when we propose to separate the surface from the mineral .... 50
The court concluded that these congressional debates
indicated that Congress intended for the 1909 and 1910 Acts to
reserve only solid rock. The "overriding objective for Congress was
to insure an adequate reserve for the nation's primary energy
source"- coal. 5' Congress issued the 1909 and 1910 Acts as
unlimited patents to reserve a single specific mineral - coal. The
legislative reservation of minerals in the Act of 191452 demonstrated
a much broader scope of mineral reservation by listing each mineral:
"phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas, or asphaltic minerals. 53
VII. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION RULES FOR INDIAN LAWS

The Tribe argued that when ambiguity exists in federal
Indian statutes or regulations, the general rule is to resolve these
matters in favor of the Tribes. The court held that the 1909 and 1910
Acts are not federal Indian laws. Instead, they are public land laws.
Although the Acts may affect Indian lands, the Acts were not passed
for the specific benefit of the Tribes. Therefore, the court would not
apply the rule in this case.54
VIII. 1981 SOLICITOR GENERAL'S OPINION55

The court reviewed the effect of the 1981 Solicitor's Opinion
which addressed the issue of ownership of coalbed gas in land where
the minerals were reserved to the United States. 6 The 1981
Solicitor's Opinion did not address minerals on Tribal lands but
concluded that the United States coal reservation did not include the
coalbed gas. 57 The court found that Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.58 controlled the analysis for
determining the weight given to the 1981 Solicitor General's Opinion:
49

1d. (citing 45 CONG. REC. 6044 (1910) (emphasis added)).
'Old.
at 1157.
51
Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1158.
52
1d. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 121 (1914)).
53
1d. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 121 (1914) (emphasis added)).
-'4d.at

1159.

"See infra text accompanying note 79 (opinion withdrawn).
56Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1159.
S7d. (citing 1981 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 12 at 540). See also Rights to
Coalbed Methane Under an Oil & Gas Lease for Lands in JicarillaApache Reservation, 98
Interior Dec. 59 (1990).
58Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.5 9
The agency's decision is given controlling weight unless it is
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute., 60 The
1909 and 1910 Acts do not mention coalbed gas or define "coal."
Therefore, the issue for the District Court was whether the 1981
Solicitor's Opinion was based on a permissible construction of these
statutes. The court affirmed this position.61
IX. THE COURT OF APPEALS

62

The issues that were presented for appeal were:
1.

Whether Congress intended to grant to agricultural
entrymen who elected to receive limited patents
under the Act of March 3, 1909 or the Coal Lands
Act of 1910 the right to extract coalbed methane and
other substances from coal deposits underlying the
patented lands, even though those Acts reserved to
the United States "all coal in said lands" and "the
63
right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same."

2.

Whether, under the circumstances of this case and
the doctrines set forth in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), the court is required to defer to the ex
parte 1981 opinion of the Solicitor of the Department

591d. at 842-43 (citations omitted).
60
Southern Ute, 874 F. Supp. at 1159.
61

id "

62

Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Colo.
1995), rev'd 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).
63
Alice E. Walker, Presentation of Summary of Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco
Production Company at the Eastem Mineral Law Foundation Coalbed Methane Workshop 4
(June 6, 1995) (copy of the presentation on file with the author).
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of the Interior, when that opinion is contrary to
Confess' intent and established rules of public land
law.
3.

Whether the District Court erred in entering
judgment against the Tribe on its second claim for
relief, which asserted that tribal consent was required
to invade tribal coal deposits to extract coalbed
methane, no matter who owned the coalbed
methane.65

The Tribe sought a declaration that the owner of coal
deposits and the owner of the right to prospect for, mine, and remove
coal reserved under the 1909 and 1910 Acts also owned the coalbed
methane located in the deposits and the right to extract coalbed
methane from the coalbeds.
On July 16, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and held that the
Tribe, as the successor in interest to the United States' statutory
reservation of coal, was the owner of the coalbed methane underlying
the subject lands. In reaching its decision, the court analyzed the
Acts that were the source of the Tribe's interest.
The Court of Appeals further considered the 1981
Department of the Interior Solicitor's opinion, Ownership of and
Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in FederalCoal Deposits." The court
found that the Solicitor's opinion was not binding policy because it
was not promulgated through the adequate administrative procedures.
It was only a "public pronouncement that Interior will not assert the
federal government's right to CBM under its reservation of coal" but
rather under its oil and gas reservations.67 The court also stated that
the case on which the Solicitor relied in support of his conclusion was
overruled on appeal and that the opinion was inconsistent with
Interior statements made contemporaneously with the acts. The court
was convinced that the Solicitor's interpretation of the acts was
arbitrary because he did not explain how "Congress could have
intended to convey a substance neither known to be valuable nor
severable at the time of the enactments," and so omitted potentially
64d.
"Brief for Plaintiff at 1-2, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 2 F.3d
1023 (10th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1579).
688 Interior Dec. 538 (1981). See infra text accompanying note 79 (opinion
withdrawn).
67Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 833.
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determinative factors from his analysis. 68 The Southern Ute case was
remanded to the trial court to address various issues raised by the
defendants.
Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a
rehearing en banc which was held on March 17, 1998. In its July 20,
1998 opinion,69 the court again reversed the trial court. The July 20,
1998 opinion follows much of the same reasoning set forth in the
1997 decision. The only issue addressed in the rehearing was
whether the use of the term "coal" in the acts unambiguously included
or excluded coalbed methane.70
The Court of Appeals found that the Acts were ambiguous
with reference to the definition of "coal." Because ambiguities in
land grants are construed in favor of the government and. no interest
passes other than those conveyed by clear language, the reservation
of coal in the Acts included coalbed methane. 7' Therefore, the Tribe,
as successor in interest to the United States, is the owner of the
coalbed methane.
In assessing whether the Acts were ambiguous, the court
attempted to determine whether Congress intended to reserve coalbed
methane when it reserved coal. The court first looked to the plain
meaning of the statutes, finding that the Acts did not define coal and
did not mention coalbed methane. Therefore, the court found the
statutes' plain language failed to reveal congressional intent regarding
coalbed methane.72
The Court of Appeals next evaluated Congress' specific
intent when passing the Acts. The court examined whether there was
sufficient evidence to conclude that Congress unambiguously
intended the term "coal" to include coalbed methane. The court noted
that the Acts themselves revealed nothing about specific
congressional intent. It found that at the time the Acts were passed,
the commercial value of the gas had not been recognized.
Furthermore, at that time there was no clear definition of the term
"coal." Some definitions characterized "coal" as a solid rock, while
others used descriptions which could include coalbed methane.
Therefore, the court concluded that the specific intent of Congress
could not be determined.73

681d. at 836.
69
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 151 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1998) (en
banc).

70

id. at 1256.

71id

Id. at 1258.
131d. at 1261-63.
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The Court of Appeals then considered Congress' general
intent in passing the Acts. The court reviewed the historical events
behind the Acts and the reasons for the coal reservations. It
recognized that Congress considered, and rejected, the idea of
reserving "all minerals" in the Acts. However, the court found that
Congress' decision not to reserve "all minerals" did not reveal
whether the reservation of coal included coalbed methane. The court
also noted that:
Congress knew there was indeterminate potential
value in the reserved coal and intended to secure that
value for the United States. Rather than indicating a
limited reservation of coal to the United States, the
legislative history suggests that Congress adopted an
interpretation of coal which encompassed both the
present and future economic value of coal for energy
purposes, including value that could only be realized
through advances in technology such as those which
drive the present day exploration for CBM.74
This broad general intent, combined with the fact that Congress failed
to clearly convey coalbed methane to the surface owners, persuaded
the court that the United States reserved the coalbed methane.
Finally, the Court of Appeals reviewed other statutory
reservations of minerals and "found no occasion in which a
reservation of a mineral asset to the United States has been treated
narrowly to exclude a newly appreciated value associated with that
mineral... .05 The court concluded that the use of the term "coal" in
the Acts did not unambiguously exclude or include coalbed methane.
Because all uncertainties involving mineral reservations and land
grants must be construed in favor of the United States, the coal
reservation in the Acts included coalbed methane. Congress' general
intent in passing the Acts and interpretations of other statutory
mineral reservations also supported this holding.7 6
X. COURT OF APPEALS DISSENT

Judge Tacha authored a dissenting opinion in which two
other judges joined. The dissent argued that the term "coal" is not
ambiguous. It reasoned that at the time the Acts were passed, the
4

7 1d.at 1265.
75

d
761d." at 1267.
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plain and ordinary meaning of "coal" clearly excluded coalbed
methane. Furthermore, the existence of coalbed methane "was very
much a part of the general knowledge in 1909." 7 The dissent also
argued that the Acts sought to protect the nation's supply of coal, and
did not reserve what was then considered a dangerous waste product.
It also claimed that no difference existed between coalbed methane,
which is trapped in coal, and other gases, which are commonly found
trapped in shale, sandstone, or other rock.78
Xl. THE SUPREME COURT79

Amoco filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court and
oral argument on the writ was held on April 19, 1999. Interestingly,
"[on] the day the Government's response to petitioners' certiorari
petition was due ... the Solicitor of the Interior withdrew the 1981
opinion in a one-line order stating, . . . '[t]he United States now
supports the Tribe's ?Iosition that CBM gas is coal reserved by the
1909 and 1910 Acts." °
On June 7, 1999, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals decision. Justice Kennedy authored the
opinion, holding that "coal," as used in the Acts, does not include
coalbed methane. The Supreme Court focused on the question of
whether, in 1909 and 1910, Congress considered coalbed methane to
be a part of coal. The Supreme Court noted that Congress "was
dealing with a practical subject in a practical way." 8' Therefore, it
was appropriate to examine the relevant terms as they were used in
"their ordinary and popular sense." 82 The Court found that, at the
time the Acts were passed, the concept of "coal" included only the
solid rock mineral.83
The Court explained that dictionaries from that time
consistently define "coal" as a solid mineral.84 These dictionaries also
define "methane", "marsh gas" or "fire-damp" as "a gas 'contained in'
or 'given off by' coal, but not as coal itself."8 5 The Court concluded
that the definitions indicated that, at the time the Acts were passed,
the common understanding of the term "coal" would not have
7id.

at 1268 (Tasha, J., dissenting).

Rd. at 1271 (Tasha, I., dissenting).
79Amoco Prod. Co. v.Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
goid. at 872.
8W.
at 873.
9Id.

83d. at 874.

8Amoco Prod. Co. 526 U.S. at 874.

MNd. at 875.
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included coalbed methane.8 6 The Court further stated that coalbed
coal
methane was viewed as a "distinct substance that escaped from
87
itself."
coal
the
of
part
a
as
than
rather
mined,
was
as the coal
The Supreme Court supported its position by looking to the
history of the Acts. It noted that the purpose of the Acts was to
preserve the nation's energy resources. At the time, coalbed methane
was not an energy source. Instead, it was thought to be a dangerous
by-product of coal mining. Therefore, Congress had no reason to
reserve the coalbed methane. 88
Finally, the Court addressed the Tribe's argument that if the
coalbed methane was owned separately from the coal, a split estate
would be created which would make coal mining difficult due to the
necessity of venting the gas. The Court observed that it was unlikely
Congress considered this issue. 89 It further noted that the issue before
it was not one of damage or injury (caused by split estates), but a
question of ownership. 90 Nevertheless, the Court indicated that coal
owners may, without liability to the gas owner, vent gas while
mining, 9' and it noted that the Tribe's position would also result in a
split gas estate. If the Court were to find that coalbed methane was
owned by the coal owner, gas producers would be faced with the
problem of determining which gas originated from the coal seam. 92
The Court held that "the most natural interpretation of 'coal' as used
in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not encompass CBM gas ....
XII. SUPREME COURT DISSENT
Justice Ginsburg dissented from the decision. She stated that
she would affirm the Tenth Circuit's holding for the reasons set forth
in that decision.94
XIII. BEYOND SOUTHERN UTE
Thus ended a landmark case in the ongoing saga of coalbed
methane development in the United States. The decision in this case
will be far-reaching and, in fact, has spawned other legislation. It
6Id.
87

1d. at 874.
Said. at 875-876.
89
Amoco. Prod. Co., 526 U.S. at 878.
9OId. at 879.
91
' d. at 879-80.
92
1d. at 879.
93
1d. at 880.
9id.
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will also certainly be interesting to mark the progress of coalbed
methane disputes on private lands in the years to come.
XIV. LEGISLATION

A. Public Law No. 105-36795
On November 10, 1998, President Clinton signed into law
new federal coalbed methane legislation as Public Law No. 105-367.
This legislation was a direct result of the 10'h Circuit Court of
Appeal's holding in the Southern Ute case. Congress enacted the
legislation to "protect the sanctity of contracts and leases entered into
96
by surface patent holders with respect to coalbed methane gas.
Basically, the law protects leases and contracts covering any land that
was conveyed by the United States under the 1909 and 1910 Acts that
were entered into by a person who has title to land derived under the
Acts and that conveyed the rights to explore for, extract, and sell
coalbed methane from this land. In addition, the law protects coalbed
methane production from the lands derived from the 1909 and 1910
Acts by a person who has title to the land and who, on or before the
date of enactment of this Act, has filed an application with a state
agency for a permit to drill an oil and gas well to a target in a coal
formation.
The applicability of the act was limited to valid contracts or
leases in effect as of the enactment date (Nov. 10, 1998). 97 In
addition, it only applies to lands to which the United States is the
owner of the coal reserved to it in a patent issued under the 1909 or
1910 Acts, the position of the United States as the coal owner not
having passed to a third party by deed, patent, or other conveyance. 98
Most importantly, the act shall not apply to any interest in coal or
land conveyed, restored, or transferred by the United States to a
federally recognized Indian Tribe. The act shall not be construed as a
waiver of any rights of the United States with respect to coalbed
methane production that is not subject to subsection (a). 99

"Pub. L. No. 105-367, 112 Stat. 3313 (codified as 30 U.S.C. § 81 (Supp. 2000)).
96Id.
97Id.

981d.
99Id. at 3313-14.
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B. Public Law No. 106-311°°
On May 21, 1999, President Clinton signed into law a bill
commonly referred to as the Kosovo Funding Bill. One of the riders
attached to this bill affects coalbed methane permitting in the Powder
River Basin. Specifically, the bill appropriates $1,000,000 for the
Bureau of Land Management to use in the processing of CBM well
permit applications for wells in the Powder River Basin.'01 This
program may not process applications where the proposed well site is
located in an area covered by a coal lease, a coal mining permit, or an
application for a coal mining lease, unless the coal and gas operators
entered into a written agreement.
XV. THE EFFECT OF SOUTHERN UTE ON STATE COURT DECISIONS
In evaluating coalbed methane disputes, state courts have
looked to three basic theories to determine ownership, which has
been simplified below for purposes of illustration. 0 2 First, if the
conveyancing or reservation terms are ambiguous, the intent of the
parties should be considered (the "intent theory"). The second theory
evaluates the words "coal" and "gas" and their definitions as used in
the relevant documents and statutes.
If the instruments do not
explicitly grant rights to "gas" or "coalbed gas," then such rights were
reserved (the "definitions theory"). The third theory reasons that
removal of coalbed methane is so essentially and inextricably tied to
the mining process that the rights to the coalbed methane gas must
necessarily be intended to be conveyed when the rights to the coal are
conveyed (the "production method theory").
These three theories were addressed in the Southern Ute
analysis and have been used in the coalbed methane cases involving
private lands. These approaches would also most likely be applied
by a state court evaluating a private lands dispute. The major
'loKosovo Funding Bill, Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57 (1999).
01
1Id.at 88.
102Three Approaches to Coalbed Methane Case Decisions
I - INTENT - What was the intent of: (a) the parties to the deeds; and/or (b) the legislators
when legislation was drafted?
2 - DEFINITIONS - the definitions or plain meanings of the terms gas, coal, and minerals have
played a factor in many of the courts' decisions
3 - PRODUCTION METHOD - the location (or site) of the coalbed methane at the time of its
capture has influenced certain of the decisions, along with the methods used for production of
coalbed methane Definitions - the definitions or plain meanings of the terms gas, coal, and
minerals have played a factor in many of the court's decisions. See Elizabeth A. McClanahan,
CoalbedMethane: Myths, Facts,and Legends of its Historyand the legislativeand Regulatory
Climate in the 21st Century, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 471 (1995). See generally, Southern Ute Indian
Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 151 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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difference in analysis between the Southern Ute decision and a state
court analysis would involve the application of the intent theory.
The Southern Ute Court looked at congressional intent behind the
1909 and 1910 Acts, while a court examining the private lands cases
would look to the intent of the parties to the relevant agreements.
XVI. DEFINITIONS AND INTENT METHODS
When deciding Southern Ute, the Supreme Court examined
the definitions of "coal" and "gas." The Court looked at the
understanding of "coal" and "gas" and found that the historical and
current understandings about the resources support the holding that
the coalbed methane belongs to the gas estate. In Southern Ute, the
Court also looked at dictionary definitions at the time of the Acts in
an attempt to discern congressional intent behind the Acts. Although
we have not examined dictionaries from 1948 through the present,
modem sources continue to refer to "coal" as a solid substance and
"methane" as a clear gas.10 3 We can be assured that, when
adjudicating a private lands case, a state court will look to the
definitions of the terms and the intent of the parties to the relevant
leases or deeds.'0 4 While reliance on dictionary meanings and
common usage may be appropriate in assessing congressional intent,
it may not be appropriate in a private lands situation. The legislators
who were dealing with the problems addressed in the Acts were not
experts in the coal or energy fields; they were elected officials with
various backgrounds. By contrast, the parties negotiating private
instruments may be experts in the industries with which they were
dealing. The dictionary definitions, while useful and appropriate to
the lay person, do not fully reflect the terms' meanings as understood
by those engineers and businessmen operating in the industry.

t3

1 See, e.g., THE NEW LEXICON WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE: DELUXE ENCYCLOPEDIA EDITION (1987) (coal . . . a combustible deposit of
vegetable matter . . rendered compact and hard by pressure and heat"; "methane . . . an

odorless, colorless, inflammable hydrocarbon . . . found in natural gas and coal mines (firedamp).

It is an important constituent of coal gas."); MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1997).
"Deeds are constructed in the same manner and under the same principles as other
written instruments, the fundamental purpose being to arrive at the intention of the parties.'

23

AM. .IUR. 2D Deeds § 222, n.40 (1983) (citing Rush v. Champlin Refining Co., 321 P.2d 697
(Okla. 1958); Crow v. Thompson, 131 S.W.2d 1064, writ dism. (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Joseph
Mann Library Ass'n v. Two Rivers, 272 Wis. 44, 76 N.W.2d 388 (1956)).

2000-2001]

SOUTHERN UTE
XVII. PRODUCTION METHOD

In Southern Ute, the Court addressed the Tribe's argument
that if the coalbed methane was owned separately from the coal, a
split estate would be created, which would make coal mining difficult
due to the necessity of venting the gas. The Court indicated that the
coal owners may have vented gas while mining without liability to
the gas owner, and it specifically found that the right to vent gas for
mining purposes did not imply ownership of the coalbed methane.
The Court thus rejected the Tribe's split-estate argument, noting that
if the Court were to conclude that coalbed methane is owned by the
coal owner, the gas estate would be split and producers would be
faced with the problem of determining which gas originated from the
This theory, which has been
coal seam and which gas did not.
analyzed and adopted in Alabama, Florida, Montana, and
Pennsylvania, may have less weight for future courts considering the
issue after the Southern Ute case. 10
XVII.

CONCLUSION

A United States Supreme Court decision is binding upon
state courts in cases of federal questions and U.S constitutional
issues.'0 6 Since the Southern Ute decision is an interpretation of
federal land acts, it is not binding on state courts in questions
involving private land and contract disputes. Although the decision
is not binding on state courts, I expect that state courts would find the
decision persuasive and advisory.?°7 It may, therefore, weaken some
of the analysis made by the state courts in previous coalbed methane
decisions.

'O°The following decisions were determined based all or in part upon the production
method: NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. West, 631 So. 2d 212 (Ala. 1993); Vines v. McKenzie
Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305 (Ala. 1993); In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 207 B.R. 299
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680 (Mont.
1995); United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
106Henderson v. State ex rel Frazier, 65 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 1953); New Orleans
Water-Works Co. v. Southern Brewing Co., 36 F. 833 (C.C.E.D. La. 1888); Dodge v. Adams
Express Co., 54 Pa. Super. 422,425 (1913).
107Railway Passenger Assurance Co. of Hartford v. Pierce, 27 Ohio St. 155 (1875).

